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TRUMP ADMINISTRATION MAKES A SPLASH: THE ALTERED
CLEAN WATER ACT’S RIPPLING EFFECT ON STATE
AND FEDERAL WATER REGULATION
Clean water ranks near the top of the list of environmental
concerns for both Americans and politicians alike.1  Since Congress
enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1972, it has imposed envi-
ronmental regulations on individuals and corporations, fining viola-
tors who pollute the waters of the United States.2  The Obama
Administration, by way of the Clean Water Rule, redefined the
scope of the CWA by establishing the Act to include the “Waters of
the United States” (WOTUS).3  The Clean Water Rule more clearly
defines the tributaries and adjacent waters under federal jurisdic-
tion by stating: “[A] tributary must show physical features of flowing
water – a bed, bank, and ordinary high water mark – to warrant
protection.”4  The Obama Administration’s changes to the CWA al-
tered the traditional definition of the “WOTUS” set out by the orig-
inal CWA when it was created in 1972.5 Presently at issue is the
Trump Administration’s proposed controversial change to effec-
tively roll back the same provisions of the CWA previously modified
by the Obama Administration.6
1. See Ellie Kaufman, EPA Announces New Definition of Waters Protected Under
Clean Water Act, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 11, 2018, 4:25 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2018/12/10/politics/epa-wotus/index.html (describing importance Americans
give to clean water in light of all environmental issues).
2. See generally id. (describing general purpose and accomplishments of Clean
Water Act).
3. See generally Factsheet Clean Water Rule, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/fact_sheet_sum
mary_final_1.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (providing information about Obama
Administration’s changes to Clean Water Act by way of Clean Water Rule). The
Obama administration changed the definition and scope of the Clean Water Act
by redefining the WOTUS as all-encompassing of freshwater sources in the United
States. Id. (illustrating redefinition of WOTUS).
4. Id. (describing in detail Obama Administration’s redefining of WOTUS).
5. Id. (explaining Obama Administration’s intent behind changes to CWA
under Clean Water Rule). The Obama Administration believed that their changes
would revert to the original purpose and scope of the CWA, that is, to be as all
encompassing. Id. (illustrating Obama-era interpretation of CWA’s purpose).
6. Id. (describing how Trump and Obama administrations scrutinized and
changed definition of “waters of the United States”).
(83)
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I. GETTING YOUR SEALEGS: BACKGROUND SURROUNDING PRESIDENT
TRUMP’S PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE CLEAN WATER ACT
President Trump fulfilled one of his campaign pledges by issu-
ing Executive Order 13778, directing the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to publish the Clean Water Rule “for notice and
comment” to consider its amendment or revocation.7  The Execu-
tive Order also requested the reversion of the Clean Water Rule to
“a manner consistent with the opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia in
Rapanos v. United States”8 by interpreting “navigable waters” to mean
“relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of
water,” and only cover wetlands with a “continuous surface connec-
tion” to such relatively permanent waters.9
On December 11, 2018, President Trump announced his plan
to drastically alter the CWA by retracting the Obama Administra-
tion’s definition of the WOTUS.10  Under this proposal, the CWA
would no longer federally protect nearly all American wetlands and
thousands of miles of U.S. waterways.11  President Trump’s propo-
sal aims to redefine the EPA’s definition of the WOTUS, which the
Obama Administration changed.12
Additionally, this proposal limits water that falls under federal
protection to “major waterways, their tributaries, adjacent wetlands
and a few other categories.”13  The Administrator of the EPA, An-
7. Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497, 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017) (outlin-
ing Trump Administration’s proposed changes to WOTUS under CWA); see Pat-
rick Parenteau, The Clean Water Rule: Not Dead Yet, 48 ENVTL. L. 377, 380 (2018)
(describing how and why Trump Administration created executive order to alter
CWA).
8. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (describing Justice
Scalia’s plurality opinion from Rapanos).
9. Parenteau, supra note 7, at 377 (outlining Justice Scalia’s definition of “nav-
igable waters” as was intended by original wording of Clean Water Act).
10. See Ellie Kaufman, EPA Announces New Definition of Waters Protected Under
Clean Water Act, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 11, 2018, 4:25 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2018/12/10/politics/epa-wotus/index.html (describing President Trump’s plan
to repeal and replace Clean Water Rule).
11. Id. (explaining specifics of proposed change to definition of WOTUS
under CWA).
12. Id. (describing President Trump’s rationale behind proposed changes to
CWA).
13. Nathan Rott, Trump EPA Proposed Major Rollback of Federal Water Regulation,
NPR (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/11/675477583/trump-epa-
proposes-big-changes-to-federal-water-protections (explaining specific elements of
President Trump’s proposed changes to CWA). The proposed waterways protected
under the proposed changes are now “major waterways, their tributaries, adjacent
wetlands and a few other categories,” areas President Trump believes revert the
CWA to its original purpose and make it less confusing. Id. (outlining rationale
behind Trump Administration’s proposed CWA changes).
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drew Wheeler, claims the change aims to benefit landowners in pos-
session of the lands surrounding waterways to “provide states and
landowners the certainty they need to manage their natural re-
sources and grow local economies.”14
The proposed change runs afoul of the definition amended by
the Obama Administration in 2015, which broadened federal water
protection to include waterways and their tributaries.15  Farming
and agricultural lobbyists, including the American Farm Bureau
Federation, have pushed back against the Obama Administration’s
regulation changes since they came to fruition in 2015, believing
the Clean Water Rule was used as a pretext to arbitrarily control
portions of their farmland.16
In contrast, opponents of the Trump Administration’s pro-
posed change speculate that President Trump is attempting to
change the Obama-era rule to appease some of his constituents.17
From an environmental standpoint, President Trump’s most avid
supporters and constituents include rural farmers, real estate devel-
opers, and golf course owners because the Obama-era rule was
more stringent regarding bodies of water that affected land devel-
opment projects, farms, and golf courses.18  The Trump Adminis-
tration prioritized the CWA’s revision, rationalizing the proposed
change by positing the Clean Water Rule was a regulatory over-
reach and “one of the worst examples of federal regulation.”19
14. Id. (describing EPA Administrator’s reasoning behind backing President
Trump’s proposed changes to CWA).
15. See Kaufman, supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining specific
elements of President Trump’s proposed changes to the CWA). President
Obama’s Clean Water Rule “aimed to widen federal clean water protections to
include not only those large waterways, but also the smaller streams and tributaries
that feed into them.” Id. (illustrating broadened water protections under Obama
Administration’s CWA).
16. See generally Trump Rolls Back Decades of Clean Water Act Protections, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46526776
(describing proponents of Trump Administration’s proposal and why it is benefi-
cial to revert to CWA’s old language).
17. See Coral Davenport, Trump Rule Would Limit E.P.A.’s Control Over Water
Pollution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/cli
mate/trump-water-pollution-wotus-replacement.html (describing how opponents
of Trump Administration’s proposal allege proposed change motivated by appeas-
ing Trump’s constituents).
18. Id. (describing President Trump’s constituents and bodies of water that
he is involved with in his non-presidential life).
19. Nathan Rott, Trump EPA Proposed Major Rollback of Federal Water Regulation,
NPR (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/11/675477583/trump-epa-
proposes-big-changes-to-federal-water-protections (explaining Trump Administra-
tion’s rationale behind proposed changes).
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Opponents believe that “[t]his proposal is reckless . . . [g]iven
the problems facing our lakes, streams and wetlands from the
beaches of Florida to the drinking water of Toledo. . . .”20  Some
environmentalists believe the proposed change will lead to in-
creased pollution levels in American waters and threaten public
health.21  More specifically, an environmental advocacy group, the
Natural Resources Defense Council, believes the Trump Adminis-
tration’s proposal will “gut water protections nationwide,” and
“limit the scope of the Clean Water Act, exempting many oil com-
panies, industrial facilities and developers from programs that aim
to protect our rivers, lakes, streams and wetlands from degrada-
tion.”22  This Comment will discuss the potential implications of the
Trump Administration’s repeal of the Obama Administration’s
water rules and regulations, including major changes to the CWA.23
First, this Comment will provide background information on the
CWA and EPA.24  Next, this Comment will discuss whether the
CWA is fulfilling its original intent or having a different effect than
intended.25  Finally, this Comment will discuss whether the CWA
should be upheld and altered to include wetlands and ephemeral
20. See Irwin Dawid, EPA and Army Corps of Engineers Propose Revision of Wetlands
Definition, PLANETIZEN (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.planetizen.com/news/2018/
12/101972-epa-and-army-corps-engineers-propose-revision-wetlands-definition
(describing opponents of Trump Administration’s proposal).  Jon Devine, director
of federal water policy for the Natural Resources Defense Council, is a major oppo-
nent and authored the abovementioned statement. Id. (illustrating Devine’s ratio-
nale behind opposition).
21. See Davenport, supra note 17 (explaining environmentalist’s opinions re-
garding detrimental environmental effects of Trump Administration’s proposed
changes).
22. Id. (describing environmental advocacy group’s position on harmfulness
of Trump Administration’s proposed changes to environment). The Natural Re-
sources Defense Counsel believes President Trump’s proposed changes will give
breaks to big businesses who are polluting, setting America back years in terms of
environmental regulation. Id. (stating environmental impact of proposed CWA
changes).
23. See Rapanos, supra note 8 and accompanying text (describing Trump Ad-
ministration’s proposed changes as reason for debate among environmentalists
and politicians alike).
24. See Robinson Meyer, How the U.S. Protects the Environment, From Nixon to
Trump, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/ar
chive/2017/03/how-the-epa-and-us-environmental-law-works-a-civics-guide-pruitt-
trump/521001/ (describing CWA in general and legislative history of how water
regulation has changed over years).
25. See David Keiser & Joseph S. Shapiro, How the Clean Water Act has served the
environment and the economy, VOX (Oct. 24, 2018), https://voxeu.org/article/im
pact-clean-water-act (describing amount of money expended by taxpayers since
CWA enactment in 1972). This illustrates where the CWA does and does not work,
as well as proposed changes to improve water regulation. Id. (outlining cost-benefit
analysis of CWA implementation).
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streams under the WOTUS or if it should be repealed and replaced
with another piece of legislation.26
II. MAN-MADE MAYHEM: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CWA
The federal government’s first attempt at curtailing water pol-
lution came in the form of 1948’s  Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA).27  Congress subsequently opened the FWCPA up to
amendments.28  The FWPCA was in effect until 1972, when Con-
gress amended the statute again in response to growing public con-
cern over reversing the damage caused by water pollution; as such,
the FWPCA became known as the CWA of 1972.29  Congress made
multitudes of amendments to the CWA over the years, which have
ultimately become the skeleton of the modern CWA.30  Though
there were subsequent revisions in 1978, 1981, 1987, and 1990 that
expanded the CWA’s scope to different bodies of water and intensi-
fied pollution regulations, the general framework of the CWA has
remained constant since it was enacted in 1972.31
26. See Ellie Kaufman, EPA Announces New Definition of Waters Protected Under
Clean Water Act, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 11, 2018, 4:25 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2018/12/10/politics/epa-wotus/index.html (describing proposals of intragovern-
mental regulation that would improve CWA).
27. See Laws & Regulations, History of the Clean Water Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/history-clean-water-act (last visited
Feb. 14, 2019) (describing government’s first attempt at regulating water in United
States).
28. Id. (explaining then-existing concern of curtailing water pollution into
WOTUS).
29. Id. (describing government’s second attempt at curtailing water pollution
in form of amendment that ultimately became Clean Water Act).
30. See id. (listing amendments to Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
1948 that are basis of CWA today). Some of the amendments to the CWA are as
follows: “[e]stablished the basic structure for regulating pollutant discharges into
the waters of the United States”; “[e]stablished the basic structure for regulating
pollutant discharges into the waters of the United States”; “[g]ave EPA the author-
ity to implement pollution control programs such as setting wastewater standards
for industry”; “[m]aintained existing requirements to set water quality standards
for all contaminants in surface waters”; “[m]ade it unlawful for any person to dis-
charge any pollutant from a point source into navigable waters, unless a permit was
obtained under its provisions”; “[f]unded the construction of sewage treatment
plants under the construction grants program”; “[r]ecognized the need for plan-
ning to address the critical problems posed by nonpoint source pollution.” Id. (ex-
plaining amendments to CWA over time).
31. See History of the Clean Water Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/history-clean-water-act (last visited Feb. 14, 2019)
(describing subsequent revisions that did not affect CWA, but rather supple-
mented it to allow it to become CWA as understood today).
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The Trump and Obama Administration’s debate over the
CWA’s scope stems from the definition of the WOTUS.32  The
Trump Administration’s proposal seeks to redefine the WOTUS to
exclude “ephemeral streams” and “wetlands not directly connected
or adjacent to large bodies of water.”33  Although ephemeral
streams only appear after rainfall and were therefore only recently
addressed in environmental regulation, the wetlands change would
alter protections dating back to the George H.W. Bush Administra-
tion.34  The Trump Administration’s proposed change to the defi-
nition of the WOTUS “would not change protections for large
bodies of water[,] . . . neighbouring wetlands, and any state-im-
posed rules. . . .”35
A. Overview of the CWA
The general purpose of the CWA is “[r]estoration and mainte-
nance of chemical, physical and biological integrity of [the] Na-
tion’s waters.”36  This general purpose also governs the objective of
the CWA to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and bio-
logical integrity of the Nation’s waters.”37  Given this stated purpose
and objective, the CWA, on its face, aims to be as encompassing as
possible regarding environmental protection.38  Under the CWA,
water pollution can come from two different sources: point and
nonpoint sources.39  Nonpoint sources are pollution acts such as
32. See Trump Rolls Back Decades of Clean Water Act Protections, BBC (Dec. 11,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46526776 (describing con-
stant battle between new and old presidential administrations changing the CWA’s
definition of the WOTUS).
33. Id. (describing specifics of Trump Administration’s proposal). President
Trump aims to limit the scope of the WOTUS under the CWA to not include
“ephemeral streams” because he believes that this is “a more precise definition” of
the CWA. Id. (explaining Trump Administration’s desire to reduce CWA’s
ambiguity).
34. Id. (explaining historical implications of Trump Administration’s pro-
posed changes to the WOTUS).
35. Id. (clarifying what provisions continue under Trump Administration’s
proposed changes to WOTUS definition). The Trump Administration is only
changing one small portion of the WOTUS; however, this one small portion is
what past presidential administrations have been tweaking since the CWA’s enact-
ment in 1972. Id. (explaining WOTUS as controversial term).
36. See generally Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012) (describing gen-
eral purpose, intent, and scope of CWA).
37. Id. (explaining statute’s purpose of maintaining water integrity).
38. See id. (stating purpose and intent of CWA as “[r]estoration and mainte-
nance of chemical, physical and biological integrity of Nation’s waters”).
39. See Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The Clean Water Act and the Challenge
of Agricultural Pollution, 37 VT. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2013) (explaining two different
types of water pollution as recognized and defined under CWA).
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“leakage” or “runoff” that are difficult to trace back to the original
source of contamination, making their regulation much more
challenging.40
The CWA vests power to the states to regulate both agricultural
point and nonpoint sources of water pollution.41  The CWA defines
a pollutant as “dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sew-
age, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological
materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equip-
ment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricul-
tural waste discharged into water.”42  This list describes nearly any
type of man-made waste that an individual or company could possi-
bly create.43  Thus, the list goes hand-in-hand with the CWA’s aim
to be as inclusive as possible regarding environmental protection.44
The text of the CWA includes all “navigable waters” of the
United States.45  Before the proposed changes, the term “navigable
waters” was defined as “the waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas.”46  This section, regarding the definition of navi-
gable waters covered under the CWA, is precisely the section that
has been scrutinized by both the Obama and Trump Administra-
tions.47  Courts have attempted to interpret the term “waters of the
United States” with Congress’s intent in mind, broadening the
CWA’s terms “to the limits of [their] constitutional authority.”48
40. See id. at 1034 (explaining intricacies of nonpoint sources of water pollu-
tion and how they are indirect as opposed to point source contaminants).
41. Id. (clarifying where EPA receives its originally congressionally-vested pow-
ers to regulate environment).
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2017) (listing types of pollutants covered under
CWA protection).
43. See id. (generalizing that all types of man-made pollutants covered under
CWA).
44. See id. (describing definitions within CWA as being as encompassing as
possible).
45. Id. § 1362(7) (including “navigable waters” in definition of CWA).
46. Id. § 1362(8) (defining navigable waters and waters of the United States,
including territorial seas as waters protected under the CWA).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)-(8) (listing both navigable waters meaning waters of
the United States, including territorial seas as encompassed by CWA protection);
see Ellie Kaufman, EPA Announces New Definition of Waters Protected Under Clean Water
Act, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 11, 2018, 4:25 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/10/
politics/epa-wotus/index.html (explaining Obama Administration’s Clean Water
Rule protections and proposed changes by President Trump).
48. See Patrick Parenteau, The Clean Water Rule: Not Dead Yet, 48 ENVTL. L. 377,
383-84 (2018) (restating Congress’ original intent of scope of CWA to be as en-
compassing as possible).
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B. Where Does the CWA’s Power Come From and How Does
the EPA Regulate It?
As the environment has not been of great regulatory concern
over the last fifty years, there is no explicit constitutional authority
granting the EPA the power to regulate.49  Accordingly, a logical
place to start when looking at the power of the executive branch
concerning the EPA is how EPA derives its power and enforces
compliance.50  In 1970, President Nixon united with Congress to
pass a series of laws that established the EPA.51  Establishment
through executive order means the EPA can only act under con-
gressionally-approved statutes in a manner also consistent with ex-
ecutive instruction.52
1. EPA’s Regulatory Process
The first step in the regulatory process is for Congress to write
a bill relating to a prevalent environmental issue.53  Next, the Presi-
dent approves or vetoes the bill.54  If the President approves the bill
and the ensuing act is codified, the EPA can then create additional
regulations to implement the law and serve the purpose set out by
the executive branch.55
The first step in implementing a regulation is for the EPA to
propose a regulation.56  The Agency proposes a regulation by re-
viewing the complex issue at hand and issuing a Notice of Proposed
49. See Robinson Meyer, How the U.S. Protects the Environment, From Nixon to
Trump, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/
archive/2017/03/how-the-epa-and-us-environmental-law-works-a-civics-guide-
pruitt-trump/521001/ (explaining Congress’ delegation of power to EPA because
of explicit Constitutional authority).
50. See id. (stating where EPA derives power from and process behind enforc-
ing water regulation to ensure compliance).
51. See id. (listing specifics of President Nixon’s establishment of EPA).
52. See id. (explaining process by which EPA is able to pass regulations to
protect environment).
53. See The Basics of the Regulatory Process, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/basics-regulatory-process (last visited Feb. 2, 2019)
(stating first step of regulatory process as member of Congress proposes bill). “A
bill is a document that, if approved, will become law”. Id. (defining role of bill in
regulatory process).
54. Id. (describing second step of regulatory process). “If both houses of Con-
gress approve a bill, it goes to the President who has the option to either approve it
or veto it.” Id. (outlining further regulatory steps).
55. Id. (explaining third step of regulatory process as House of Representa-
tives standardizes text of law and publishes it in United States Code upon act’s
passing).
56. Id. (describing first step in creating regulation). When creating regula-
tions, “the [a]gency [first] researches the issues, and if necessary, proposes a regu-
lation.” Id. (describing how agencies propose regulatory language).
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Rulemaking (NPRM).57  Once the EPA proposes the regulation,
the EPA collects feedback from political activists, businesses, farm-
ers, and the general public, and the agency may then alter the regu-
lation accordingly.58  Next, the EPA publishes the final rule in the
Federal Register and the EPA’s official docket, and once the regula-
tion has gained approval—or in some cases without full approval—
the EPA codifies the regulation to the upcoming volume of the
Code of Federal Regulations.59
2. Constitutional Authority
Diving deeper, it is important to understand the source from
which Congress derives its power to create statutes governing the
environment.60  The Commerce Clause of the United States Consti-
tution states that Congress has the power “to regulate commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.”61  Every environmental law passed since 1970, in-
cluding the CWA, has relied on the powers granted by the Com-
merce Clause, which states that Congress’s power is derived from a
need “to restrict air and water pollution and protect endangered
species.”62  The CWA is unique because it is one of the two environ-
mental statutes in which Congress has delegated all regulatory
power to the EPA.63  Under this delegated power, the EPA may con-
stitutionally create any regulation related to water pollution,
57. See id. (explaining significance of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). The
NPRM proposal is “listed in the Federal Register so that members of the public can
consider it and send their comments to us.” Id. (explaining purpose for NPRM).
58. See The Basics of the Regulatory Process, supra note 53 (explaining how regula-
tory process is altered and changed according to general public’s opinion).
59. Id. (listing codification into CFR as last step in regulatory process).
60. See generally Robinson Meyer, How the U.S. Protects the Environment, From
Nixon to Trump, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/sci
ence/archive/2017/03/how-the-epa-and-us-environmental-law-works-a-civics-
guide-pruitt-trump/521001/ (explaining how Congress delegates its power over
environmental regulation to EPA).
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (defining Congress’ powers granted under
Commerce Clause). The purpose of the Commerce Clause “was to establish a per-
fect equality amongst the several States as to commercial rights, and to prevent
unjust and invidious distinctions, which local jealousies or local and partial inter-
ests might be disposed to introduce and maintain.” Id. (establishing origin of fed-
eral environmental regulation).
62. See generally Robinson Meyer, supra note 60 (explaining authoritative
power basis for creating environmental protection laws).
63. See generally id. (describing process of executive branch acquiring Congres-
sional powers through delegation to regulate specific thing).
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though EPA regulations are still subject to be overturned by Con-
gress if the regulations are unpopular.64
Due to the longevity of the CWA, it has been subject to multi-
ple alterations by different presidential administrations throughout
the decades.65  In 2015, the Obama Administration broadened the
definition of what “bodies of water” the federal government had
regulatory authority over to include ephemeral streams and wet-
lands.66  In response, the Trump Administration has proposed a
regulation that divides waters into six categories: “traditional navi-
gable waters, tributaries to those navigable waters, certain ditches—
including those used for navigation or affected by the tide, certain
lakes and ponds, impoundments and wetlands that are adjacent to
water covered by the rule.”67  The issue arises not with what waters
the Act encompasses but with what waters the proposal excludes.68
The waters excluded are: “groundwater; ditches, including roadside
and farm ditches; prior converted cropland; storm water control
features and wastewater and waste treatment systems.”69  The
Trump administration claims the newly proposed interpretation of
the CWA will make it “easier to understand,” whereas critics believe
that it is a blind power grab to fulfill his campaign promise of re-
pealing the Obama administration’s changes to the CWA.70
3. Compliance Enforcement Under the CWA
Individual compliance with the CWA is determined by regula-
tions proposed and established by the EPA with the CWA’s broad
64. Id. (describing limits of agency regulatory power). Regulations established
by the EPA “carry the force of law,” but the regulations can be superseded or
deemed moot by a Congressional law because “Congress remains the higher
power.” Id. (explaining limitations of EPA’s power).
65. See Ellie Kaufman, EPA announces new definition of waters protected under clean
water act, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 11, 2018, 4:25 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/
12/10/politics/epa-wotus/index.html (outlining changes to CWA made by both
Obama and Trump administrations).
66. Id. (describing Obama Administration’s changes to CWA’s terms).
67. Id. (outlining Trump Administration’s proposed changes to CWA).
68. Id. (explaining Trump Administration’s proposal will not include wet-
lands and ephemeral streams as historically encompassed by CWA).
69. Id. (listing specific waters not covered by CWA).
70. See Kaufman, supra note 65 (explaining conflicting opinions on what
Trump Administration’s proposal will change in terms of CWA’s scope); see also
Daren Bakst, What You Need to Know About the EPA/Corps Water Rule: It’s a Power Grab
and an Attack on Property Rights, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2015), https://
www.heritage.org/environment/report/what-you-need-know-about-the-epacorps-
water-rule-its-power-grab-and-attack (illustrating motive behind proposed rule
change).
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purpose in mind.71  According to the EPA, there is intragovernmen-
tal cooperation between “federal, state, and tribal regulatory part-
ners to monitor and ensure compliance” with the CWA and the
regulations set out to implement the Act’s purpose.72  In order to
monitor compliance, the CWA has a built-in pollution-control sys-
tem, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
Program.73  The NPDES Program issues permits to facilities that
serve as “point sources that discharge pollutants into waters of the
United States” and monitors which pollution practices are accept-
able.74  Under the NPDES Program, compliance is monitored by
various techniques including discharge monitoring report reviews
and “on-site compliance evaluation as well as providing assistance to
enhance compliance with NPDES permits.”75  NPDES permits,
which change “general requirements of the CWA into specific pro-
visions tailored to the operations of each person discharging pollu-
tants,” are issued to any facility that discharges directly into
WOTUS.76
States are primarily in charge of monitoring and ensuring com-
pliance with the NPDES Program.77  Currently, only four states are
not authorized by the EPA to implement their own NDPES water
pollution control programs.78  The EPA oversees and governs au-
thorized state programs, enumerates responsibilities over unautho-
rized states, including Native American Country, and maintains
71. Clean Water Act (CWA) Compliance Monitoring, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/compliance/clean-water-act-cwa-compliance-monitoring
(last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (explaining how individual compliance enforced by EPA
under rules established by CWA).
72. See id. (explaining how enforcement process includes cooperation at all
levels of government).
73. See id. (stating purpose of NPDES Program and how compliance is
monitored).
74. Id. (describing point permits and to whom they are issued).
75. Id. (explaining who monitors compliance under CWA and process behind
monitoring it).
76. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-permit-basics (last visited Feb. 2,
2019) (clarifying who is granted NPDES permits and purpose of NPDES permit
system).
77. See Clean Water Act (CWA) Compliance Monitoring, supra note 71 (explaining
what level of government institutes compliance monitoring according to current
structure of state and federal EPAs).
78. NPDES Permits Around the Nation, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/npdes-permits (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (listing states exempted
from NPDES permit requirements). The four states not authorized to implement
their own NDPES programs to control water pollution are: Idaho, New Mexico,
Massachusetts and New Hampshire. See id. (illustrating division between federal
and state regulation).
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federal facilities.79  The NPDES Compliance Monitoring Strategy
“provides implementation guidance to EPA regions and authorized
states by describing EPA’s inspection frequency goals.”80
Most granted NPDES permits are called publicly owned treat-
ment works (POTW).81  POTW are wastewater treatment facilities
that collect wastewater from domestic, commercial, and industrial
facilities, which then treat the wastewater and typically discharge
treated water into a stream, creek, river, lake, estuary, or ocean.82
The CWA establishes general pretreatment program regulations,
and the three types of national pretreatment standards that apply to
industrial users are prohibited discharges, categorical standards,
and local limits.83  The pretreatment programs must be approved
by the “Approval Authority,” which oversees implementation and
enforcement of the pretreatment programs either at the state or
federal level of enforcement.84
Additionally, each POTW must develop a response plan to en-
sure compliance.85  Response plans include minimum require-
ments for all creators to obey.86  The EPA also encourages the
79. See Clean Water Act (CWA) and Federal Facilities, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/clean-water-act-cwa-and-federal-facilities (last
visited Feb. 2, 2019) (explaining power breakdown of EPA’s control over NPDES
authorized and unauthorized states with regard to NPDES permit system).
80. See Clean Water Act (CWA) Compliance Monitoring, supra note 71 (clarifying
NPDES permit’s purpose and goal).
81. Pretreatment Roles and Responsibilities, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/npdes/pretreatment-roles-and-responsibilities (last visited Feb. 2,
2019) (clarifying difference between NPDES permitholders and POTW).
82. See id. (explaining types of POTW facilities and types of regulated
pollution).
83. See id. (listing general pretreatment program regulations and types of na-
tional pretreatment standards POTWs permit and regulate).
84. Id. (stating pretreatment plans must include specific components). The
pretreatment plans must include: “[l]egal authority to implement the program”;
“[p]rocedures for program implementation”; “[f]unding adequate to implement
the program”; “[l]ocal limits, including periodic reevaluations to ensure that the
limits remain protective of the POTW”; “[e]nforcement, including development
and implementation of an enforcement response plan”; and “[a] comprehensive
list of industrial users.” Id. (outlining pretreatment plan requirements).
85. Id. (stating POTW required response plan). POTWs will look into and
address any instance of non-compliance. Id. (explaining POTW’s role in compli-
ance process).
86. See Shawn D. Hagerty & Rebecca Andrews, Establishing and Managing Was-
tewater Treatment Facilities Under the Clean Water Act, WESTLAW w-010-9851 (2017)
(listing procedures necessary to implement pretreatment programs). The proce-
dure is as follows: “[d]escribe how the POTW will investigate instances of noncom-
pliance; [d]escribe the types of escalating enforcement responses the POTW will
take in response to all anticipated types of industrial user violations and the time
periods within which responses will take place; [i]dentify the officials, by title, re-
sponsible for each type of response; and [a]dequately reflect the POTW’s primary
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POTWs to create an enforcement plan to monitor the enforcement
of the response plan.87  The general requirements of these enforce-
ment response plans include identifying the official responsible for
taking an enforcement action; the time frame for actions; the ex-
pected responses from a discharger; and the “potential escalated
actions based on . . . the nature of the violation . . . magnitude of
the violation . . . duration of the violation . . . frequency of the
violation . . . [and] effect of the violation.”88  The mechanisms of
enforcement are determined by the amount of power the individ-
ual regulatory agencies grant to the POTW.89  Common mecha-
nisms of enforcement are informal notices and meetings, warning
letters, administrative orders and compliance schedules, adminis-
trative fines, civil actions, criminal prosecution, or termination of
service.90  Thus, the process of compliance enforcement under the
CWA is part of a complete framework; however, it is not always
monitored efficiently and effectively.91
Section 404 of the CWA regulates “the placement of dredged
or fill material into wetlands, lakes, streams rivers, estuaries and cer-
tain other types of waters.”92  The purpose of this section is “to
avoid and minimize losses to wetlands and other waters and to com-
pensate for unavoidable loss through mitigation and restoration.”93
Both the EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers are responsi-
ble for Section 404’s implementation and compliance with the per-
mits issued, and, in the event of unpermitted discharges,
conducting the on-site investigations.94
responsibility to enforce all applicable pretreatment requirements and standards.”
Id. (illustrating POTW procedures); see 40 C.F.R. § 403.8(f)(1)-(2) (describing stat-
utory requirement for POTW response plans).
87. Pretreatment Roles and Responsibilities, supra note 81 (explaining purpose of
creation of response plan and how it is enforced).
88. Introduction to the National Pretreatment Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/pretreatment_program_iintr_2011.pdf (last
visited Feb. 3, 2019) (listing requirements of enforcement response plans).
89. Id. (explaining mechanisms of enforcement and pretreatment program
requirements in NPDES permits for POTWs).
90. Id. (listing formal mechanisms of enforcement).
91. See id. (summarizing enforcement and compliance monitoring of CWA by
EPA).
92. Clean Water Act (CWA) Compliance Monitoring, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/compliance/clean-water-act-cwa-compliance-monitoring
(last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (defining scope of Section 404 including regulated pollu-
tants and bodies of water).
93. Id. (defining purpose of Section 404).
94. Id. (listing who is responsible for monitoring compliance under Section
404).
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4. Data Analysis: CWA Enforcement Statistics
EPA data demonstrates that in 2018, state regulatory agencies
inspected 27,474 facilities with general NPDES permits, while the
EPA inspected only 974.95  Of those inspected by the state regula-
tory agencies, 10,338 were not in compliance with the regulations
established under the CWA, and of those inspected by the EPA, 407
were not in compliance.96  These individual permitholders who
were in violation were considered “Category 1” violators, the most
serious of violations.97  “Category 1” violators are considered guilty
of “significant noncompliance,” which includes: “[c]hronic viola-
tions of certain wastewater discharge limits, [d]ischarges that cause
imminent endangerment to human health, welfare, or the environ-
ment, [f]ailure to meet certain compliance milestones, and
[f]ailure to provide required reports.”98  Formal enforcement ac-
tions were filed against 329 noncompliant facilities inspected by the
EPA and 2,465 inspected by the state regulatory agencies.99  Finally,
of those facilities in which formal enforcement actions were filed,
ninety-eight facilities inspected by the EPA and 1,315 inspected by
state regulatory agencies were sanctioned with monetary
penalties.100
Based on these statistics, the EPA is neither given enough
power to regulate the facilities, judging by the sheer difference in
95. Analyze Trends: State Water Dashboard, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
echo.epa.gov/trends/comparative-maps-dashboards/state-water-dashboard?view
=activity&state=national (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (showing EPAs at both state and
federal levels inspected 27,474 facilities and 974 facilities, respectively).
96. Id. (showing 10,338 facilities not in compliance on state level and 407 not
in compliance on federal level).
97. Water Dashboard Help, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://echo.epa.gov/
help/water-dashboard-help (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (defining Category 1 viola-
tions). “Category 1 [a.k.a. Significant Noncompliance (SNC) for permittees desig-
nated as majors] and Category 2 . . . [f]acilities identified as in Category 1
noncompliance are typically those facilities with the most serious violations of their
permit effluent limits in terms of duration, frequency, and magnitude, other per-
mit requirements.” Id. (differentiating Category 1 and 2 violations).
98. See Shawn D. Hagerty & Rebecca Andrews, Establishing and Managing Was-
tewater Treatment Facilities Under the Clean Water Act, WESTLAW w-010-9851 (2017)
(listing parameters involving individual that is in “significant noncompliance”).
99. Analyze Trends: State Water Dashboard, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
echo.epa.gov/trends/comparative-maps-dashboards/state-water-dashboard?view=
activity&state=national (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) (showing 329 facilities inspected
by EPA and 2,465 inspected by state regulatory agencies).
100. Id. (stating monetary penalties assessed to ninety-eight facilities in-
spected by the EPA and 1,315 inspected by state regulatory agencies). These
choices demonstrate “the distribution of enforcement actions with monetary pen-
alty by enforcement action lead agency state, other authorized agency, or EPA).”
Id. (showing current divisions of power between federal and state EPAs).
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number of facilities inspected, nor given the power to govern how
the states inspect the facilities through their individual regulatory
agencies.101  From a regulatory perspective, the lack of EPA power
is concerning because a federal environmental protection statute
enacted by a federal regulatory agency should have the majority of
its control delegated to the federal government, not the state gov-
ernment.102  This imbalance of power is especially concerning
when there are trillions of taxpayer dollars at stake.103
Although the CWA has reduced and limited water pollution, it
costs the government and taxpayers billions of dollars per year to
enforce regulations.104  Since its creation in 1972, conservative esti-
mates believe the CWA has cost “650 billion [dollars] in expendi-
ture due to grants the federal government provided municipalities
to build sewage treatment plants or improve upon existing facili-
ties.”105  To break that down into a more comprehensible number,
“it costs approximately . . . 1.5 million [dollars] to make one mile of
river fishable for one year.”106  When measuring water quality
downstream of sewage treatment plants, the quality of the water
consistently improved after municipalities received state and fed-
eral grants.107 These funds needed to come from somewhere, and
in most cases these “federal grants” came directly out of taxpayer’s
pockets.108  In 2015, there were a reported 141.2 million taxpayers,
101. See id. (showing discrepancy in numbers between federal and state regu-
lation, enforcement, and inspection).
102. See id. (showing EPA is not able to fully enforce and regulate statute en-
acted by executive powers).
103. See David Keiser & Joseph S. Shapiro, How the Clean Water Act has served the
environment and the economy, VOX (Oct. 24, 2018), https://voxeu.org/article/im
pact-clean-water-act (listing amount of taxpayer dollars expended by CWA since
enactment at over one trillion dollars and counting).
104. See Kara Manke, Clean Water Act dramatically cut Pollution in US water-ways,
BERKLEY NEWS (Oct. 8, 2018), https://news.berkeley.edu/2018/10/08/clean-
water-act-dramatically-cut-pollution-in-u-s-waterways/ (showing amount taxpayer
dollars expended by CWA since enactment at over one trillion dollars and yearly
costs at billions of dollars).
105. Id. (stating conservative estimates total amount expended on the CWA
since enactment at 650 billion dollars expenditure on federal grants).
106. See id. (breaking down large amount spent on water regulation into
more comprehensible number).
107. Id. (explaining CWA’s successes in form of treatment plants significantly
reducing water pollution). Since the CWA was created, it “has imposed environ-
mental regulations on individuals and industries that dump waste into waterways,
and has led to 650 billion [dollars] in expenditure due to grants the federal gov-
ernment provided municipalities to build sewage treatment plants or improve
upon existing facilities.” Id. (stating cost to federal government to assist in building
or improving sewage plants).
108. See Erica York, Summary of the Latest Federal Income Tax Data, 2017 Update,
TAX FOUNDATION (Jan. 17, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/summary-federal-in
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which would equate to about 106 dollars spent per taxpayer per
year on enforcing the CWA’s regulations.109  If each taxpayer is pay-
ing over one hundred dollars per year to keep the CWA afloat, then
it is imperative that the regulations are enforced as efficiently and
effectively as possible.110
III. THE CASES CAUSING THE SPLASH
In the 2006 Rapanos case, the Supreme Court issued a plurality
decision that would become the basis of the ever-changing defini-
tion of the WOTUS.111  Twelve years later, President Trump,
through the Solicitor General, urged the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari and hastily decide County of Maui v. Hawai’i Wildlife
Fund.112  The Supreme Court is considering hearing an argument
regarding how to interpret groundwater contamination under the
CWA summarized as follows: “a violation of the [CWA] may occur
when a pollutant is released from a point source to groundwater
and ultimately migrates to a body of water covered by the
[CWA].”113  If certiorari is granted, and the lower court’s opinion is
upheld by the Supreme Court, the Maui case has the potential to
significantly change water regulation.114
come-tax-data-2017/ (showing yearly taxpayer data from taxpayer perspective of
amount paid per person).
109. Id. (listing number of taxpayers in the United States in 2015). This was
calculated by dividing the total amount spent on the CWA to date by the total
number of yearly taxpayers divided by the total number of years the CWA has been
in effect. Id. (providing data used to make calculations).
110. See id. (showing number of taxpayers in the United States in 2015 includ-
ing the amount taxpayers paid in income taxes). “In 2015, 141.2 million taxpayers
reported earning 10.14 trillion [dollars] in adjusted gross income and paid 1.45
trillion [dollars] in individual income taxes.” Id. (stating American taxpayer data
for 2015).
111. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 715-20 (2006) (plurality opin-
ion) (explaining two opinions that became presidential administration’s interpre-
tations of the CWA).
112. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 737-40 (9th Cir.
2018) (citing case that President Trump has urged Supreme Court to grant certio-
rari); see also, Duke K. McCall & Douglas A. Hastings, Solicitor General Urges US Su-
preme Court to Review Whether Clean Water Act Regulates Discharges to Groundwater,
MORGAN LEWIS (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/solicitor-gen
eral-urges-us-supreme-court-to-review-whether-clean-water-act-regulates-discharges-
to-groundwater (stating President Trump’s actions by urging Solicitor General to
hear case involving redefining WOTUS).
113. See id. (explaining argument set out in County of Maui v. Hawai’i Wildlife
Fund et al. with regard to redefining WOTUS).
114. See id. (explaining opinion that has potential to ultimately change the
scope of CWA). Pollutant discharges are subject to the CWA if the discharge to the
surface water is “fairly traceable” to the discharge. Id. (discussing liability under
CWA for discharges that are linked to the pollution).
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A. Rapanos Explained
While the decision in Rapanos yielded multiple opinions, the
ones relevant to this discussion are Justice Scalia’s plurality and Jus-
tice Kennedy’s concurrence.115  Mr. Rapanos drained and filled-in
twenty-two acres of “wetlands” on property that he owned in prepa-
ration for a construction project.116  His project was stopped be-
cause the EPA interpreted the definition of “navigable waterway”
under the CWA as “areas connected to or linked to waters via
tributaries or other similar means.”117  Mr. Rapanos attempted to
circumvent the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Riverside
Bayview, where the Court found that wetlands were within the
CWA’s scope because waters with a “significant nexus” to navigable
waters were covered under the CWA.118
Justice Scalia took a textualist approach and stated that
WOTUS should include “relatively permanent, standing or flowing
bodies of water” as supported by the Webster’s Dictionary defini-
tion of water.119  Justice Scalia’s approach appears to be closest to
the “commonsense understanding,” as the CWA does not list “inter-
mittent or ephemeral flows” under its definition of the WOTUS.120
Furthermore, Justice Scalia noted that interpreting the CWA in this
way would be stretching the definition of the WOTUS far beyond
legislative intent, as “[t]he plain language of the statute does not
authorize this ‘Land is Waters’ approach to federal jurisdiction.”121
The Trump Administration’s proposed changes to the definition of
WOTUS are derivative of Justice Scalia’s textualist approach.122
115. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 716, 733, 754 (citing Justice Scalia’s plurality opin-
ion and Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion).
116. Id. at 789 (describing background information of Rapanos).
117. Id. at 724-26 (discussing background information regarding Mr. Rapa-
nos’ project being stopped due to his property being encompassed by “navigable
waters” as defined under CWA).
118. See id. at 753-56 (describing significant nexus test ultimately discussed in
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence).
119. See id. at 716 (reciting definition of WOTUS from Webster’s Dictionary);
Courtney Covington, Rapanos v. United States: Evaluating the Efficacy of Textualism in
Interpreting Environmental Laws, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 801, 811 (2007) (describing in
detail Justice Scalia’s approach to WOTUS definition under CWA).
120. Covington, supra note 120, at 811 (discussing Justice Scalia’s approach to
WOTUS definition under CWA).
121. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 734 (explaining Justice Scalia’s rationale behind his
opinion that CWA would be stretched far beyond its legislative intent).
122. See Ellie Kaufman, EPA Announces New Definition of Waters Protected Under
Clean Water Act, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 11, 2018, 4:25 PM),  https://www.cnn.com/
2018/12/10/politics/epa-wotus/index.html (describing Trump Administration’s
proposed changes to CWA).
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Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion disagreed with Justice
Scalia’s opinion on how WOTUS should be interpreted.123  Justice
Kennedy believed that under the CWA, a “wetland” or “non-naviga-
ble waterbody” was considered WOTUS if it possessed a “significant
nexus” to a traditional navigable waterway.124  Justice Kennedy’s ar-
gument focused primarily on the premise that a significant nexus
exists where the wetland or waterbody affects the “biological integ-
rity” of the downstream navigable waterway, and thus should be cov-
ered under the CWA’s definition of the WOTUS.125  Justice
Kennedy labeled Justice Scalia’s opinion as being “‘inconsistent
with the Act’s text, structure, and purpose,’” and asserted that the
“biological integrity” argument is taken directly out of the CWA’s
wording, thereby interpreting the CWA on its face.126 Interpreting
the CWA on its face resulted in the “significant nexus” to navigable
water approach, which is very similar to what the Obama Adminis-
tration created in the Clean Water Rule.127
B. Maui Explained
Since Rapanos, some courts have solely employed Justice
Scalia’s “continuous connection” approach, whereas other courts
have required a combination of Justice Scalia’s “continuous connec-
tion” and Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” approaches.128  In
Maui, “a citizen’s group brought suit against a county after waste-
water injected into underground wells was found to have reached
the Pacific Ocean.”129 The issue in Maui boils down to “whether the
123. Memorandum from Benjamin H. Grumbles and John P. Woodley on
Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S., Supreme Court’s Decision in
Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Dec.
02, 2008), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/
cwa_jurisdiction_following_rapanos120208.pdf (describing difference between Jus-
tice Scalia’s plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion).
124. Id. (explaining in detail Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” interpreta-
tion of WOTUS under CWA).
125. Id. (stating rationale behind “significant nexus” interpretation as pro-
moting biological integrity of ecosystems in all WOTUS).
126. Id. (explaining Justice Kennedy’s “on its face” reading of CWA by inter-
preting CWA to protect all biological diversity in WOTUS).
127. See Factsheet Clean Water Rule, EPA, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/
sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/fact_sheet_summary_final_1.pdf (last
visited Jan. 22, 2019)(describing Obama Administration’s redefining of WOTUS
under CWA by instituting Clean Water Rule).
128. See generally Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (plurality
opinion) (explaining WOTUS definition based on Scalia’s opinion)
129. See generally Two Circuit Courts Allow Groundwater Discharge Liability Under
Clean Water Act, PRAC. L. REAL EST., Apr. 23, 2018, Westlaw W-014-3396 (stating
general background for case).
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[CWA] is violated by releases of pollutants to groundwater that sub-
sequently enter a ‘water of the United States.’”130  Under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a) of the CWA, “discharge of a pollutant” is prohibited in
“navigable waters from any point source.”131  The statute defines
navigable waters to include “waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas;” however, groundwater is explicitly excluded
from the list of waters of the United States.132
In Maui, the Ninth Circuit held that pollutant discharges are
subject to the CWA if the discharge to the surface water is “fairly
traceable” to the discharge.133  This “fairly traceable” link is similar
to Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test in Rapanos and directly
contrasts Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion.134  If the Supreme Court
were to grant certiorari and adopt the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
Maui, it would be the first decision of its time to completely employ
Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” approach without also, or
solely, employing Justice Scalia’s “continuous connection”
approach.135
IV. RIVER’S END: WHERE THE CWA DOES NOT WORK AS
CONGRESS INTENDED
As of 2018, the CWA has cost taxpayers more than one trillion
dollars total since enacted in 1972.136  Economists who oppose the
allocation of funds to the CWA do so because research indicates
that the benefit of the CWA does not outweigh the exorbitant
costs.137  Of the one trillion dollars spent since 1972, 650 billion
dollars in the form of thirty-five thousand individual federal grants
to cities have gone towards new treatment plants, improvement of
130. Id. (discussing various arguments regarding redefining CWA definition
of WOTUS).
131. Id. (describing navigable waters as defined under CWA); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(6) (2019) (defining discharge of pollutant under United States Code).
132. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 723 (stating navigable waters theory of CWA as
established under Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos).
133. Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018)
(describing “fairly traceable” theory of CWA’s definition of WOTUS established by
Ninth Circuit in recent ruling).
134. For a further discussion on the different Rapanos tests, see supra note 123
and accompanying text.
135. For further discussion on the precedential potential of Maui, see supra
notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
136. David Keiser & Joseph S. Shapiro, How the Clean Water Act has served the
environment and the economy, VOX (Oct. 24, 2018), https://voxeu.org/article/im-
pact-clean-water-act (describing amount of money expended by taxpayers since
CWA enactment in 1972).
137. For a further discussion on EPA’s regulatory authority under the CWA,
see supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
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existing plants, and upgrades to sewers for the individual cities.138
Although these individualized grants were proven to reduce pollu-
tion in cities within a twenty-five mile radius over a thirty-year pe-
riod, there is minimal evidence that residents of those cities value
the clean water, and the increase in house value and quality of life
is not outweighed by the extraordinary cost.139  If the estimated
change in home value due to CWA funding was outweighed by the
costs of implementing the changes, this indicates that individuals
were not focused on regulation targeting the water itself.140  Thus,
although the CWA demonstratively reduces pollution, it fails on a
cost-benefit analysis, as individuals value the environmental impact
less than the money expended.141
The water-targeting regulations under the CWA are widely un-
successful from an economic standpoint because of waste at the
state government level.142  The EPA’s power is limited in regard to
the creation of water pollution control plans under the CWA be-
cause “[n]othing in the CWA allows the EPA to produce a substi-
tute plan for a disapproved state plan.”143  Therefore, in the event
the EPA believes that a state is improperly allocating funds at the
state level, the EPA has no power to overrule or modify the state’s
plan.144  The EPA’s only remedy is to attempt to strong-arm the
states into total compliance with the CWA by withholding federal
grants unless the state’s plan meets certain preestablished
parameters.145
138. See David Keiser & Joseph S. Shapiro, Consequences of the Clean Water Act
and the Demand for Water Quality, 134 Q. J. OF ECON. 349, 390 (2018) (stating statis-
tics about amount of money spent on CWA enforcement and regulation by way of
vast amount of federal grants).
139. Id. at 352 (describing number of years and radius of cleanup of CWA
since enactment in 1972).
140. See id. (describing change in estimated home value due to successful en-
vironmental cleanup).
141. Id. at 351 (discussing cost-benefit analyses of CWA).
142. See Keiser & Shapiro, supra note 137 (describing state-level government
programs aimed at water pollution itself rather than compliance and enforcement
of CWA).
143. Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The Clean Water Act and the Challenge of
Agricultural Pollution, 37 VT. L. REV. 1033, 1042 (2013) (discussing lack of power
given to federal EPA in present day environmental regulation).
144. See id. (addressing inefficiency in CWA regulation and enforcement that
does not give federal EPA enough power to properly regulate states).
145. Id. (discussing only remedy that federal EPA has to combat state-level
inefficiency in regulation and compliance enforcement).
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The CWA also fails in regard to the type of pollution it protects
against.146  Although the purpose and scope of the CWA is sup-
posed to include nonpoint sources of water pollution, the CWA in-
advertently ignores nonpoint pollution sources from agricultural
runoff and industrial waste leakage into the water supply.147  With
the primary focus of regulation and enforcement on those in pos-
session of an NPDES permit, it is nearly impossible to calculate the
extent of the nonpoint source pollution on a national level, espe-
cially when nonpoint source pollution is generally accidental.148
This ignorance to nonpoint source pollution makes tracking the
amount of pollution and calculating expenses for cleanup difficult
and costly.149
In 2014, states issued “223 new fish advisories, bringing the to-
tal advisories recognized by the EPA to 4,821” and demonstrating
that the CWA seems to fail at regulating nonpoint source pollu-
tion.150  As of 2011, there were “17.7 million lake acres and 1.36
million river miles . . . under advisory,” a number which represents
“42.3 percent of the nation’s total lake acreage and [thirty-six] per-
cent of the nation’s total river miles.”151  Moreover, “[o]f the na-
tion’s 3,650 beaches monitored in 2011, health notifications and
closures affected 33,127 beach-days.”152  In conclusion, although
the CWA has helped to clean up pollution from point sources, it
fails entirely at calculating and regulating nonpoint source pollu-
tion, suggesting the benefits of the CWA seem to be outweighed by
the costs of its enforcement and compliance.153
146. See Keiser & Shapiro, supra note 139, at 356 (discussing authors’ pro-
posed position that CWA fails at regulating pollutants from “nonpoint” sources).
147. Id. (explaining how CWA inadvertently ignores “nonpoint” sources of
pollution). “Much water pollution also comes from ‘nonpoint’ pollution sources
such as urban and agricultural runoff. Id. (explaining difficulty of regulating
nonpoint sources). The Clean Water Act has largely exempted these latter sources
from regulation.” Id. (illustrating waters not yet encompassed by CWA).
148. See id. (discussing pollution in form of “runoff” that is inadvertently ex-
cluded from CWA regulation).
149. For a further discussion on the regulation of nonpoint source pollution
under CWA, see supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
150. See John Cronin, The 31st Anniversary of the Clean Water Act’s Failure to
Achieve Its First Policy Goal, EARTHDESK (July 1, 2014), https://earthdesk.blogs
.pace.edu/2014/07/01/the-31st-anniversary-of-the-clean-water-acts-failure-to-meet-
its-first-policy-goal/ (giving statistics regarding fish advisories in waters supposedly
cleaned and protected by CWA).
151. Id. (stating statistics explaining condition of WOTUS, including lakes
and rivers, despite CWA regulation and enforcement).
152. Id. (stating statistics explaining how polluted some WOTUS are, includ-
ing oceans, despite CWA regulation and enforcement).
153. For a further discussion on the shortcomings of the CWA, see supra
notes 146-152 and accompanying text.
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Congress, in delegating their control over the environment to
the EPA, intended for the EPA to regulate the environment to the
fullest extent of its constitutional authority.154  Moreover, Congress
intended the CWA to encompass as much of the United States’ wa-
ters as possible.155  The CWA succeeds in its congressionally in-
tended purpose, but does not succeed in efficiency.156  With the
constant stream of proposed changes to the CWA by each new pres-
idential administration, it is quite difficult for both the EPA and the
individual states’ regulatory agencies to establish a system of consis-
tent intragovernmental regulation.157  Because each proposed
change is different from the last, the EPA and the individual state
regulatory agencies are uncertain as to the scope of the WOTUS
under the CWA and the extent of the constitutional authority they
will be permitted to act upon.158  To achieve efficiency in regula-
tion, the question arises as to whether the CWA ought to be re-
placed entirely by a new federal water protection statute or whether
parts of the CWA should continue to be changed to fit the current
presidential administration’s agenda.159
V. RIDING THE WAVE: PROPOSALS OF EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE
INTRAGOVERNMENTAL REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT
A new proposal could come in the form of a change to the
current CWA’s definition of the WOTUS or a repeal of the CWA
with a formal replacement policy.160  Regardless of the choice, the
proposal must be efficient and effective, and it must promote in-
tragovernmental regulation.161  The best possible solution would be
154. For a further discussion on the EPA’s authority under the CWA, see
supra note 48 and accompanying text.
155. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012) and accompanying text
(explaining CWA’s purpose and intent to be as encompassing as possible).
156. For a further discussion on the success and shortcomings of the CWA,
see supra notes 146-153 and accompanying text.
157. For a further discussion on the history of presidential changes to CWA,
see supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
158. See id. (comparing and contrasting Obama and Trump Administration’s
proposals to see key differences in goals of given administration’s proposed
regulation).
159. For a discussion of how the differences between the Obama and Trump
Administrations’ proposals are leading to questions about where CWA regulation
should go in the future, see supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
160. For a summary of changes made to the CWA and the definition of
WOTUS over the past decade by the Obama and Trump Administrations, see supra
notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
161. For a further discussion of the Trump Administration’s proposed
changes to the CWA and the Clean Water Rule, see supra notes 4-9 and accompa-
nying text.
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one that reallocates the power to where Congress originally in-
tended it to be delegated: the federal EPA.162  Another successful
proposal would be one that combines the Trump and Obama Ad-
ministration’s EPA’s ideas into one cohesive rule change to the
CWA that may gain bipartisan approval.163  Lastly, the Trump Ad-
ministration could replace the Clean Water Rule with an alternative
water regulating statute.164
A. Reallocating Power Where It Should Be Vested
A properly proposed change to the CWA would allow the EPA
to take full control over the WOTUS, including waters within the
individual states.165  In this type of proposal, the state governments
would simply be acting as enforcers of the law as opposed to indi-
vidual states making proposals for their own regulatory plans.166  To
achieve the maximum social welfare from CWA enforcement,
lawmakers’ best bet is to spend more of the allocated funding on
proper enforcement of the CWA.167  The EPA needs to be given the
power to overrule the state regulatory plans because the majority of
the wastefulness from the CWA stems from inefficiencies within
state government.168  A change like this would allow for the proper
constitutionally vested authority, the EPA, to regulate all of the
WOTUS without state-level interference.169  The proposal would
also reduce government waste and increase social welfare because
the EPA, being an executive branch regulatory agency, has the most
162. For a description of the process by which Congress delegated control of
the environment to the EPA, see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
163. For a summary of changes made to the CWA and the definition of
WOTUS over the past decade by the Obama and Trump Administrations, see supra
notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
164. See Kaufman, supra note 1 (discussing Trump’s reason for proposing
changes to CWA as being part of his campaign promise to constituents).
165. For a discussion of state-level inefficiencies regarding enforcement of
and compliance with environmental protection provisions established by the CWA,
see supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion of state-level overreach regarding the number of tests
performed by both state and federal EPAs, see supra notes 95-103 and accompany-
ing text.
167. See Keiser & Shapiro, supra note 167, at 382 (describing lack of social
welfare achieved from CWA regulation targeted at water itself). “Related patterns
have been found for air pollution, and suggest that allowing the stringency of pol-
lution regulation to vary over space has potential to increase social welfare.” Id. at
392 (discussing similarities between air and water pollution).
168. For a discussion of potential waste from state-level inefficiencies sur-
rounding compliance and enforcement of the CWA, see supra notes 95-103 and
accompanying text.
169. See Meyer, supra note 24 (describing process by which Congress has dele-
gated EPA power to control environment).
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power and knowledge to create successful and efficient regula-
tions.170  For example, the EPA would have the authority to instruct
states that portions of their CWA compliance are less efficient than
national averages and need to be changed to fit the status quo.171
These state-level inefficiencies could come by way of expensive
water treatment facilities, testing, or simply manpower hours ex-
pended to ensure compliance.172  More than 650 billion of taxpayer
dollars are being allocated towards state water treatment facilities
and the reduction of water pollution as a whole, and there is no
correlation with an in increase in social welfare.173  It is time to start
reallocating taxpayer dollars to enforcement and compliance of the
rules under the CWA not only to make sure that companies are
complying with the CWA, but also that the EPA is enforcing the
penalties imposed to deter future pollution.174
Although one could argue that such a change would raise com-
mandeering red flags under the Tenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, the power to regulate water was never actually
vested in the states in the first place.175  Congress has completely
delegated its power of environmental control to the federal EPA,
not necessarily the individualized state EPAs.176  Congress needs to
step in and “emphasize in statute that water resources are best pro-
tected when the federal and state partnership outlined in the CWA
is respected,” not when a regulation permits states to make their
own regulatory plans and the federal EPA has little say.177
170. See id. (explaining process of state-level CWA enforcement and
regulation)
171. For a discussion of why the EPA should be given more power, see supra
notes 142-145 and accompanying text.
172. See Pretreatment Roles and Responsibilities, supra note 81 (suggesting poten-
tial sources of state-level inefficiencies causing improper enforcement and regula-
tion of CWA).
173. See Keiser & Shapiro, supra note 167, at 382, 392 (discussing social wel-
fare regarding water regulation targeted at water itself instead of enforcement and
compliance).
174. See Analyze Trends: State Water Dashboard, supra note 95 (mentioning en-
forcement of penalties regarding issues of compliance and enforcement of provi-
sions of CWA).
175. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (defining 10th amendment right that Federal
Government cannot overreach constitutional authority to affect state rights).
176. See Meyer, supra note 24 (describing process by which Congress has dele-
gated EPA power to control environment).
177. Daren Bakst, What You Need to Know About the EPA/Corps Water Rule: It’s a
Power Grab and an Attack on Property Rights, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2015),
https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/what-you-need-know-about-the-
epacorps-water-rule-its-power-grab-and-attack (discussing what Congress must do
to stop process of Presidential Administration defining WOTUS only to be over-
turned by subsequent presidential administrations).
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B. Where Different Waters Meet: Combining Past and Present
EPA’s Ideas
Another proposed change would be a combination of propos-
als suggested by the former EPA Administrator under the Obama
Administration, Gina McCarthy, and changes to the CWA to make
the WOTUS less ambiguous and more agreeable from a bipartisan
standpoint.178  Three of McCarthy’s most applicable suggestions
were as follows: “[r]educe uncertainties about the scope of the
CWA;” “[c]reate new paradigms including state, tribal, city roles
and incentives for local action; and “[c]oordinate closely with local,
state, and regional stakeholders, including elected officials, indus-
try, non-governmental organizations, and environmental enti-
ties[.]”179  From a regulatory standpoint, these three changes would
reduce inefficiency and government waste on a federal, state, and
local government level because the three levels of the government
would be working together in unison.180  This is because the root
cause of these inefficiencies is regulatory uncertainty regarding the
definition of the WOTUS under the CWA.181  If Congress wants this
type of intragovernmental cooperation, then it must develop clear
definitions for jurisdictional waters through clear-cut rules and de-
fine “waters of the United States” as generally being limited to tradi-
tional navigable waters.182
This type of redefinition would be similar to Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Rapanos and is the most logical reading of the WOTUS
as originally defined by the EPA in the CWA.183  Although it may
exclude some bodies of water such as wetlands and ephemeral
streams, the redefinition would cut down on both compliance and
enforcement costs because, from a regulatory standpoint, it is diffi-
cult and costly to monitor and maintain every wetland and ephem-
178. See Cronin, supra note 178 (listing some of Administrator McCarthy’s
proposed changes to CWA).
179. Id. (discussing pertinent proposals in attempt to promote bipartisan ap-
proval for changes to CWA).
180. For a discussion of why a lack of intragovernmental regulation is ineffec-
tive, see supra notes 142-145 and accompanying text.
181. See Cronin, supra note 178 (highlighting one of Gina McCarthy’s propos-
als urging Congress to come to decision to reduce uncertainties over definition of
WOTUS under CWA); see also Bakst, supra note 177 (suggesting Congress should
clearly define jurisdictional waters and WOTUS).
182. Bakst, supra note 177 (describing what Congress should do if it wants less
uncertainty surrounding definition of WOTUS under CWA).
183. For a discussion of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos, see supra
notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
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eral stream that appears temporarily after rainfall.184  Although
wetlands do harbor biological ecosystems and promote the “biologi-
cal integrity” of the nations’ waters as established by the CWA, the
sheer cost to the taxpayers of enforcing of this provision alone
needs to be addressed.185  It seems as though science moves to an
ecosystem analysis in an attempt to promote “biological integrity,”
but regulations cannot move towards this analysis against the sheer
cost of enforcement.186  A change is necessary because the majority
of the issues holding back the government from working at an opti-
mal efficiency level are never-ending battles between the federal
government redefining the WOTUS and the states not agreeing
with it.187  This needs to be remedied, as it creates government inef-
ficiency by clogging the judicial system with both lawsuits and mo-
tions to stay.188  Thus, from a cost-benefit analysis and feasibility of
regulation standpoint, and with trillions of taxpayer dollars at stake,
it is imperative that the government takes these steps to fix the way
that the federal and state EPAs enforce regulations.189
C. Clean Water Rule’s WOTUS Can Still Be Protected
Hold back the floodgates—this Comment is not advocating for
elimination of protections for wetlands and ephemeral streams
from federal water regulation entirely.190  These bodies of water
184. See Kaufman, supra note 1 (discussing how Trump Administration’s pro-
posed changes exclude wetlands and ephemeral streams from CWA protection).
185. For a description of Justice Kennedy’s “biological integrity” argument
established in the Rapanos case, see supra notes 36-38, 125-126 and accompanying
text.
186. See id. (describing Justice Kennedy’s “biological integrity” argument es-
tablished in Rapanos). According to Justice Scalia, this argument is not the “com-
monsense understanding” of the CWA and appears to stray from the text of the
Act. See Courtney Covington, Rapanos v. United States: Evaluating the Efficacy of Textu-
alism in Interpreting Environmental Laws, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 801, 826 (2007) (discuss-
ing Justice Scalia’s textual reason as to why “biological integrity” argument is not
best understanding of CWA).
187. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text (highlighting how definition
of WOTUS under CWA continues to change depending on presidential adminis-
tration’s agenda).
188. See Miano et al., WOTUS and the Reach of CWA Jurisdiction, AM. BAR ASS’N
(Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environ-
ment_energy_resources/resources/wotus/ (describing process by which motions
to stay filed after new change to CWA have potential to clog court system with
costly, unnecessary lawsuits).
189. See Keiser & Shapiro, supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing
CWA’s failure of cost-benefit analysis due to primary focus on targeting water itself,
not enforcement or compliance with CWA).
190. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text (discussing Trump Ad-
ministration’s proposal, which mainly adopts Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion from
Rapanos).
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can still be protected through an additional proposed change to
the CWA that provides economic incentives to those who go above
and beyond the minimum protections of the CWA.191  Before en-
actment, the EPA would need to outline and add basic achievable
health goals to the CWA that individuals could attain for economic
compensation.192  These public health goals would cover yearly
levels of clean up or pollution reduction.193  Although individuals
would not be required to surpass the goals, they would still provide
attractive economic incentives, in the form of federal grants or tax
cuts, to those individuals who protect and preserve wetlands or
ephemeral streams.194  Health goals would not only incentivize indi-
viduals to protect and preserve these bodies of water, but also in-
centivize individuals to protect and preserve all WOTUS as well.195
It is possible this proposal would gain bipartisan approval because it
would still define WOTUS under the CWA through its most natural
reading, thereby incentivizing individuals to protect bodies of water
that are not traditionally covered under the CWA, like wetlands and
ephemeral streams.196
D. Alternate Path: President Trump Could Replace the Clean
Water Rule
An alternative path that the Trump Administration could take
is to repeal the Obama Administration’s Clean Water Rule entirely
and replace it with a new rule.197  To fit President Trump’s political
agenda and fulfill his campaign promise, it would have to be nearly
191. See Daren Bakst, What You Need to Know About the EPA/Corps Water Rule: It’s
a Power Grab and an Attack on Property Rights, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2015),
https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/what-you-need-know-about-the-
epacorps-water-rule-its-power-grab-and-attack (listing one of Gina McCarthy’s pro-
posals to CWA, incentivizing individuals who go beyond minimum requirements
established in CWA).
192. Id. (highlighting one of Gina McCarthy’s proposals for CWA to create
system of public health goals for CWA).
193. Id. (outlining potential addition of public health goals to CWA including
yearly achievable goals).
194. See York, supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text (discussing tax-
payer dollars spent both yearly and cumulatively on CWA).
195. See Bakst, supra notes 191-193 and accompanying text (describing great
impact public health goals would have on facilitating protection of WOTUS if in-
troduced to CWA).
196. Id. (discussing Trump Administration’s proposed change as most natural
reading of WOTUS under CWA, similar to Justice Scalia in Rapanos).
197. See Coral Davenport, What Trump Can and Can’t Do to Dismantle Obama’s
Climate Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/
climate/trump-water-pollution-wotus-replacement.html (describing one of Presi-
dent Trump’s options to repeal CWA in its entirety to create new federal water
regulatory statute).
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identical to Justice Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos.198  Although Presi-
dent Trump’s proposed changes to the CWA are in line with Rapa-
nos, they would not receive approval by environmentalists and the
Democratic Party.199  A new rule would be an extremely complex
legal vortex attempting to redefine the terms of federal waterways
and wetlands to gain bi-partisan approval, a feat which past presi-
dential administrations have attempted and failed to do.200  Due to
how late it is into President Trump’s presidential term and the
looming 2020 election, and from a popularity standpoint, it is
doubtful that the president will take the route of completely dissolv-
ing the Clean Water Rule.201
VI. GLASS HALF EMPTY OR HALF FULL: CONCLUSION
In order for the CWA to work as originally intended, Congress
must step up and give a concrete definition of the WOTUS to elimi-
nate government inefficiencies and inconsistencies that occur when
enforcing the rules of the CWA.202  Both federal and state regula-
tory agencies want regulatory certainty with regard to the definition
of WOTUS under the CWA.203  Ultimately, to some degree, the
WOTUS will always be the way it was originally defined under the
CWA’s text due to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).204  The
Supreme Court found that the APA empowers individuals to seek
198. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text (describing Justice
Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos as textualist “common sense” understanding of
WOTUS based on dictionary definition).
199. Id. (describing Justice Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos).
200. See Davenport, supra note 197 and accompanying text (explaining Presi-
dent Trump’s option of replacing CWA with entirely new piece of legislation as
extremely complex legal issue with no clear-cut solution).
201. Id. (describing President Trump’s option of replacing CWA with entirely
new piece of legislation).
202. See Daren Bakst, What You Need to Know About the EPA/Corps Water Rule: It’s
a Power Grab and an Attack on Property Rights, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2015),
https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/what-you-need-know-about-the-
epacorps-water-rule-its-power-grab-and-attack (providing background behind no-
tion of Congress stepping in and giving concrete definition of WOTUS under
CWA).
203. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (clarifying what federal and
state regulatory agencies want in terms of defining WOTUS under CWA).
204. See Leah Pilconis, Administrative Procedures Act Affords Public the Right to
Participate in, Challenge CWA Permitting Procedures, ASSOCIATED GEN. CONTRACTORS
OF AM. (Aug. 29, 2012), https://www.agc.org/news/2012/08/29/administrative-
procedures-act-affords-public-right-participate-challenge-cwa (outlining Adminis-
trative Procedures Act’s relation to cases surrounding CWA). “The ruling builds on
an earlier U.S. Supreme Court decision that now affords recipients of CWA com-
pliance orders the right to challenge their alleged violations under the APA before
EPA brings an enforcement action.” Id. (illustrating method of challenging CWA).
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judicial review of “administrative compliance orders,” such as
changes to the CWA.205  Furthermore, nothing in the CWA pre-
cludes judicial review of these orders under the APA.206  Therefore,
these changes to the CWA would always be subject to judicial review
under the APA because they are a “final decision.”207  Thus, regard-
less of how the EPA and Congress eventually define the WOTUS,
lawsuits pertaining to the constitutionality of any changes and mo-
tions to stay will inevitably congest the judicial system.208  With this
in mind, it is crucial for Congress to vote on a distinct and final
definition of the WOTUS promptly so that potential lawsuits can
run their course and the definition and redefinition of the WOTUS
can finally be put to rest.209
Although there is no precise solution for defining the WOTUS,
the proposals within this Comment offer a bipartisan alternative to
the Trump Administration’s current proposal that would allow all
levels of government to work in unison to regulate and enforce the
CWA.210  In the end, all that is being discussed is maintaining the
waters of the United States in a manner that is economically feasi-
ble and fiscally responsible.211  Hopefully, the Trump Administra-
tion’s EPA can work across party lines to propose a bipartisan
alternative, similar to the ones mentioned in this Comment, to pro-
205. Id. (explaining process by which APA allows individuals to seek judicial
review in form of revisions to CWA).
206. Sean Moloney, Supreme Court Allows Legal Challenge to EPA Authority to Pro-
ceed, THE REG. REV. (Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.theregreview.org/2012/03/22/
supreme-court-allows-legal-challenge-to-epa-authority-to-proceed/ (discussing pro-
cess of judicial review for cases about changes to CWA).
207. Id. (clarifying suits can be heard because they are considered “final deci-
sions”). The APA provides for judicial review of “final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” Id. (providing method to review
agency actions).
208. See supra notes 204-206 and accompanying text (explaining potential
clogging of judicial system with lawsuits and motions to stay pertaining to any
changes to CWA).
209. See supra notes 202-203 and accompanying text (urging Congress to vote
on concrete definition of WOTUS as defined under CWA).
210. See supra notes 165-174 and accompanying text (describing properly pro-
posed plan to gain bipartisan approval).
211. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (defining WOTUS as all naviga-
ble waters of United States).
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tect one of America’s most valuable resources: the waters of the
United States.212
Brian W. Blomain*
212. See supra notes 165-201 and accompanying text (describing proposed
changes to CWA that would gain bipartisan approval in today’s political climate).
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